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# Creative Industries, Comparative Media Theory and the Limits of Critique from Within

ABSTRACT

It has become common for contemporary media and cultural theorists to claim that "there is no more outside." Such a position pushes the idea of a horizontally organized information society to the extreme and fails to account for how exclusion is a condition of possibility. This essay analyses how a "constitutive outside" functions within the creative industries as a result of the exploitation of the intellectual property generated by labour-power. The essay develops the notion of an outside as it figures in Adorno's method of immanent critique and Deleuze's logic of immanence. Finally, the essay examines how the constitutive force of an outside is a key component of Innis's theories of communications media and cultural formation. Overall, the essay argues that a political theory of media-culture is one that addresses how the outside operates as an affirmative force that holds the capacity for transformation.

Every space has become ad space.

Steve Hayden, *Wired Magazine,* May 2003.

Obsession with economic considerations illustrates the dangers of monopolies of knowledge and suggests the necessity of appraising its limitations.

Harold A. Innis, *Empire and Communications,* 1950.

The limit is not outside language, it is the outside *of* language.

Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical,* 1993.

Marshall McLuhan's (1964) dictum that media technologies constitute a sensory extension of the body holds an elective affinity with Ernst Jünger's notion of "'organic construction' [which] indicates [a] synergy between man and machine" and Walter Benjamin's exploration of the mimetic correspondence between the organic and the

inorganic, between human and non-human forms (Bolz 2002:19). Today, new information and communication technologies (ICTs) communicate with each other, seemingly independent of human intervention. Think of the dialogue between financial transactions and interest rates in banking systems, the registration of calls in telephone bills, the updating of information in your computer system. In the world of signs, the logo or brand is co-extensive with various media of communication—billboards, TV advertisements, fashion labels, book spines, mobile phones, etc. Often the logo is interchangeable with the product itself or a way or life. It appears that the social life of things is always defined by relations internal to their operation within a socio-technical system. Because all social relations are mediated, whether by communications technologies or architectonic forms ranging from corporate buildings to sporting grounds to family living rooms, it follows that there can be no outside for sociality. The social is and always has been in a mutually determining relationship with mediating forms. It is in this sense that there is no outside.

Such an idea has become a refrain amongst various contemporary media theorists. Here's a sampling:

> There is no outside position anymore, nor is this perceived as something desirable. (Lovink 2002a:4)

> Both "us" and "them" (whoever we are, whoever they are) are all always situated in this same virtual geography. There's no outside…. There is nothing outside the vector. (Wark 2002:316)

> There is no more outside. The critique of information is in the information itself. (Lash 2002:220)

In declaring a universality for media culture and information flows,[1] all of the above statements acknowledge the political and conceptual failure of assuming a critical position outside socio-technically constituted relations. One of the key failings of ideology critique is its incapacity to account for the ways in which the analyst is implicated in the operations of ideology. Such approaches displace the reflexivity and power relationships between epistemology, ontology and their constitution as material practices within socio-political institutions, discursive formations and socio-technical historical constellations, all of which are the primary settings for the instantiation of ideology. The notion of ideology as a lived relation between people and things can be retained, I think, when it is located within this kind of post-representational, materialist analytical framework.

The work of Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 1994) and German systems theorist Niklas Luhmann (1995) is clearly amenable to the task of critique of and within information societies (cf. Bogard 1996; Feenberg 2002; Lyon 2001; Rasch and Wolfe 2000; Rossiter 2003a). Scott Lash (2002) draws on such theorists in assembling his critical *dispositif* for the information age. More concretely, Lash advances his case for a new mode of critique by noting the socio-technical and historical shift from "constitutive dualisms of the era of the national manufacturing society" to global information cultures, whose constitutive forms are immanent to informational networks and flows (Lash 2002:9; cf. Wittel 2001). Such a shift, according to Lash, needs to be met with a corresponding mode of critique: *Ideologycritique* [*ideologiekritik*] had to be somehow

outside of ideology. With the disappearance of a constitutive outside, informationcritique must be inside of information. There is no outside any more (Lash 2002:10).

Lash goes on to note that "Informationcritique itself is branded, another object of intellectual property, machinically mediated" (10). Or as Adorno proclaimed a few decades earlier, "No theory today escapes the marketplace" (1990:4). It is the political and conceptual tensions between information critique and its regulation via intellectual property regimes (IPRs) which condition critique as yet another brand or logo that I wish to explore in this essay. Further, I will question the supposed erasure of a "constitutive outside" of the field of socio-technical relations within network societies and informational economies. Lash is far too totalizing in supposing a break between industrial modes of production and informational flows.[2] Moreover, the assertion that there is no more outside to information too readily and simplistically assumes informational relations as universal and horizontally organised, and hence overlooks the significant structural, cultural and economic obstacles to participation within media vectors. There certainly is an outside to information! Indeed, there are a plurality of outsides. These outsides are intertwined in singular ways with the flows of capital and the operations of biopower.[3] As difficult as it may be to ascertain boundaries, they nonetheless exist.

This essay assumes that three key forces comprise a constitutive outside of any media-information system: material (uneven geographies of labour-power, disjunctive socio-technical systems, and the digital divide), symbolic (cultural capital and a-signifying semiotic systems), and strategic (figures of critique and situated interventions). In a basic sense, legal and material outsides are indeed no more than just that. One may be said to be "outside" the rule of law when downloading pornography or music files from the Net, for instance; another is without access to a particular database due to uneven funding across and within universities, or unable to access the Net due their remote geographical location (to say nothing of their economic circumstances); or else, as a result of an individual's socio-cultural disposition, there is just no interest in such matters. Yet legal and material outsides also amount to more than this. Irrespective of how often we have heard about issues such as the digital divide, we need to hear about these outsides again and again; even better, we need to be confronted by them, and to encounter their violence—be it symbolic or material (rather than "Real," I think, since "the Real" is always already present, disruptively penetrating the imaginary and the symbolic order). We need to work out ways of addressing such issues if we want to engage with some of the basic ethico-political situations of contemporary life. Material and legal outsides at once articulate with and act as a constitutive force for ontological and biopolitical dimensions of life. This takes us to the challenge of thinking difference within negativity, which I address in the second half of this essay.

My point of reference in developing this inquiry will pivot around an analysis of the importation in Australia of the British "Creative Industries" project and the problematic foundation such a project presents to the branding and commercialisation of intellectual labour. The Creative Industries movement—or Queensland Ideology, as I have discussed elsewhere with Danny Butt (2002)—holds further implications for the political and economic position of the university vis-à-vis the arts and humanities. The institutional variant of Creative Industries—as promulgated by the likes of Tony Blair's Creative Industries Task Force (CITF) and their academic counterparts in Australia—constructs itself as inside the culture of informationalism and its concomitant econo-

mies by the fact that it is an exercise in branding. Such branding is evidenced in the discourses, rhetoric and policies of the Creative Industries, as adopted by university faculties and academics, government departments and the cultural industries and service sectors seeking to reposition themselves in an institutional environment that is adjusting to ongoing structural reforms. These reforms are attributed to demands by the "New Economy" for increased labour flexibility and specialisation, institutional and economic deregulation, product customization and capital accumulation.

The content of creative industries produced by labour-power is branded as copyrights and trademarks within the system of intellectual property regimes. However, a constitutive outside operates in material, symbolic, and strategic ways that condition the possibility of creative industries. The constitutive outside of creative industries marks its limit, and thereby its extent.[4] To this end, a critique of the limits of creative industries contributes to rather than detracts from the various mapping projects undertaken in their name. In terms of media or information critique, I am not denying that the critic or intellectual is situated within a media system—social relations are always already mediated through different communications media and architectonic forms which constitute the *dispositif* of expression. However, we don't all occupy the same situation within a media system. Much of the work in media and cultural studies has examined the delimiting role played by class, ethnicity, gender, age and so forth with regard to the production of meaning and the uses of media forms. There are also substantial political and conceptual limits to any critique that dispenses with the constitutive force of the "outside." Obviously, a substantial limit to any critique consists of the different theoretical and disciplinary knowledges accumulated by any intellectual or critic. Epistemic boundaries coupled with their institutional settings define different historical epochs and operate as a horizon of intelligibility within which the present may be understood by actors with varying capacities of expression. I will argue that Deleuze's notion of a plane of immanence provides a particularly rich conceptual framework with which to theorise the role of a constitutive outside within the logic of informationalism. My critique of the Creative Industries project also serves as a mechanism for extracting a concept of communications media that acknowledges the constitutive role of the outside—or what Deleuze terms the limit—within the plane of immanence.

Finally, my approach corresponds with the "comparative media theory" research conducted by Ian Angus (1994), who draws on the rich tradition of media and communications theory in Canada pioneered by Harold Innis, Marshall McLuhan, and Walter Ong. This work is characterised by its interest in the constitutive force of communications media as a social relation, and distinguishes itself from research in the field that is concerned with analysing media content and its effects. Comparative media theory, as set out by Angus, places an emphasis on the polemical role of critique of the dominant culture. At times this essay also adopts a polemical stance against aspects of the dominant culture as it is played out in the arts and humanities. My target is the Creative Industries and a growing tendency within media theory to ignore the constitutive force of the outside. In undertaking such a critique, my interest is in the possibilities for new institutional formations, particularly as they emerge within a field of new ICTs underpinned by antagonistic socio-political and economic relations.

Creative Industries, Intellectual Property Regimes, and the "New Economy"

The creative industries project, as envisioned by the Blair government's Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) responsible for the Creative Industry Task Force Mapping Documents of 1998 and 2001, is interested in enhancing the "creative" potential of cultural labour in order to extract a commercial value from cultural objects and services. The DCMS cast its net wide when defining creative sectors and deploys a lexicon that is as vague and unquantifiable as the next mission statement by government and corporate bodies enmeshed within a neoliberal paradigm.[5] The list of sectors identified as holding creative capacities in the CITF Mapping Document include: film, music, television and radio, publishing, software, interactive leisure software, design, designer fashion, architecture, performing arts, crafts, arts and antique markets, architecture, and advertising. The mapping document seeks to demonstrate how these sectors consist of "activities which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have the potential for wealth and job creation through generation and exploitation of intellectual property" (CITF:1998/2001).

The CITF's identification of intellectual property as central to the creation of jobs and wealth firmly places the creative industries within informational and knowledge economies. Unlike material property, intellectual property such as artistic creations (films, music, books) and innovative technical processes (software, biotechnologies) are forms of knowledge that do not diminish when they are distributed. This is especially the case when information has been encoded in a digital form and distributed through technologies such as the Internet. In such instances, information is often attributed an "immaterial" and nonrivalrous quality, although this can be highly misleading for both the conceptualisation of information and the politics of knowledge production.[6]

For all the emphasis the mapping document places on exploiting intellectual property, it's remarkable how absent any consideration of Intellectual Property (IP) is from creative industries rhetoric. It is even more astonishing that media and cultural studies academics have given at best passing attention to the issues of Intellectual Property Regimes (IPRs).[7] Perhaps such oversights by academics associated with the creative industries can be accounted for by the fact that their own jobs rest within the modern, industrial institution of the university, which continues to offer the security of a salary award system and continuing if not tenured employment despite the onslaught of neoliberal reforms since the 1980s. Such an industrial system of traditional and organized labour, however, does not define the labour conditions for those working in the so-called Creative Industries. Within those sectors engaged more intensively in commercializing culture, labour practices closely resemble work characterised by the dotcom boom, which saw young people working excessively long hours without any of the sort of employment security and protection vis-à-vis salary, health benefits and pension schemes peculiar to traditional and organised labour (McRobbie 2002; Ross 2003). During the dotcom mania of the mid to late 90s, stock options were frequently offered to people as an incentive for offsetting the often minimum or even deferred payment of wages (Frank 2000).

The attraction of stock options and the rhetorical sheen of "shareholder democracy" adopted by neoliberal governments became brutally unstuck with the crash of the NASDAQ in April 2000, which saw the collapse in share value of high-tech stocks and telcos. This "tech-wreck" was followed up by the negative impact of September 11 on

tourism and aviation sectors. The "market populism," as Thomas Frank (2000) explains, of the high-tech stock bubble was defined by a delirious faith in entrepreneurial culture and the capacity for new ICTs articulated with corporate governance and financescapes to function as a policy and electoral panacea for neoliberal states obsessed with dismantling the welfare state model and severing their responsibilities for social development. The Creative Industries project emerged out of a similar context and adopted much of the same rhetoric, with some greater orientation towards creative capital. It remains questionable as to the extent to which such rhetoric is transposable on an international scale and the extent to which it is then appropriate to be adopted by countries and regions with significantly and sometimes substantially different socio-political relations, industrial structures, and policies, and cultural forms and practices.

While the creative industries is emergent as an institutional formation, it is, I would suggest, well formed at a discursive level. The ensemble of articulation consists of four principle components that together hold a hegemonic force: (1) government policies on higher education that privilege industry affiliation over the pursuit of core values of scholarship and pedagogy within the arts and humanities; (2) Third Way ideology that is ready to legitimate a plurality of socio-cultural values, but only if they can translate into commercial form; (3) research by the OECD and an assortment of supranational research agencies, think-tanks, corporate R&D teams, and government departments that have an interest in establishing intellectual property as the architecture for a global information and knowledge economy that can extract profit from education and culture; and (4) a populist strand within the field of media and cultural studies that considers consumer (audience-student-citizen) desire as relatively autonomous and self-forming and hence the basis upon which university curricula should be shaped. This approach within media and cultural studies gained purchase in the 1980s and 90s as an alternative to the impasse of ideology critique, advocating the sovereign power of the consumer over the structural forces of the state and affiliated organizations. In this regard, the populist approach has established the preconditions necessary for a relatively smooth transition within the arts and humanities into the current era of the university as a pseudo-corporation.

Many would argue that this is all proper and good—Creative Industries is a truly responsible project, since rather than imposing a set of cultural values from above, it is giving students-as-consumers what they want and need in order to realize and obtain the kind of lifestyle and professional satisfaction and challenges they desire. I wouldn't deny that these are important factors; my argument is that for all the populism—which, in any case, is and always has been a great fallacy at a structural level if not a rhetorical one—of creative industries-style discourses, there is a substantial constituency which holds no interest for the project's proponents. A focus on the role of intellectual property regimes reveals that the labour-power of the core constituency of the creative industries—information workers, programmers, designers, media producers, and so forth—is the primary vehicle for exploitation and exclusion. Even though it is situated within the socio-technical and discursive system of the creative industries, the labour-power of creative workers functions as a constitutive outside. Just as there is no outside for information critique, for proponents of the creative industries there is no culture that is worth its name if it is outside a market economy (cf. McNamara 2002). That is, the commercialisation of "creativity"—or indeed com-

merce as a creative undertaking—acts as a legitimizing function and hence plays a delimiting role for "culture" and, by association, sociality. The institutional life of career academics is also at stake in this legitimizing process.

The valuation of culture in terms of its potential exchange value is in direct contrast to the "aesthetic" value of culture set out in the work of nineteenth century social reformer and school inspector Mathew Arnold and his mid-twentieth century incarnation, the literary critic F. R. Leavis. The guiding principle within their paternalistic, civilizing and humanistic worldview consisted of evaluating culture as "the best of what has been thought and said" (Arnold 1960:6). Such an evaluative regime became the basis upon which to uphold the moral and political authority of the ruling classes whose value system was perceived to be under threat by the emergent mass culture of the working classes and expanding bourgeoisie. Thus elite cultural forms such as painting, classical music, and sculpture were privileged over the commercial cultural technologies of popular songs, novels, newspapers, radio and the cinema that appealed to the working and middle classes. Within the culture and civilization tradition exemplified by Arnold, and more particularly Leavis and others involved in the literary critical journal *Scrutiny*, the inherent quality or aesthetics of elite cultural forms was assumed to transcend social and economic relations. Culture in this sense was static, unchanging, and exclusive. The British cultural studies tradition inaugurated by the materialist work of Williams, Hoggart, and Thompson contested this view of culture. Emerging out of the growth in adult education with the return of soldiers from the second world war, British cultural studies was interested in the everyday aspects of culture and paid particular attention to the symbolic dimensions and social uses of cultural forms. This foundation myth of cultural studies is now well rehearsed and repeated verbatim within literature in the field (see Turner 1990:41-84; Bennett 1998:87-101; Brantlinger 1990:34-67).[8] My purpose in reproducing this story of origins is to set out some initial parameters in which to locate the paradox of culture within the creative industries.

Despite the efforts of academic proponents to argue for the merits of popular cultural forms within a Creative Industries discourse informed by policies and rhetoric of the information or knowledge economy, "culture" reclaims a privileged location. And it is one that is remarkably similar in a structural sense to the discursive economy that informed the Arnoldian and Leavisite concept of culture: "quality" culture is defined within the creative industries as that which has the capacity to generate and exploit intellectual property. Since the political and economic architecture of IPRs is premised on the capacity to restrict access to the object or form enclosed within the informational and legal system of IP, culture that has been incorporated as IP is available only to those with the economic and cultural capital that enables them access to the particular cultural form encoded as IP. In this sense, culture is elite; it is certainly not "working class," and while it may be "popular" it is only popular within a particular class setting that has the means to access and control it.[9] Since access is the means to the reproduction, expansion and thus innovation of culture, the enclosure of culture as forms of knowledge within a system of IP raises questions of elitism against the populist rhetoric found within much Creative Industries discourse.

Intellectual property, as distinct from material property, operates as a scaling device whereby the unit cost of labour is offset by the potential for substantial profit margins realized by distribution techniques availed by new ICTs and their capacity to infinitely reproduce the digital commodity object as a property relation. Within the logic of

intellectual property regimes, the use of content is based on the capacity of individuals and institutions to pay. The syndication of media content ensures that market saturation is optimal and competition is kept to a minimum. However, such a legal architecture has run into conflict with other Net cultures such as open source movements and peer-to-peer networks that operate by alternative intellectual property codes, as seen in the examples of the Creative Commons licence, the open content Wikipedia encyclopedias, and Linux software (Lovink 2002b, 2003; Meikle 2002). Other instances of political conflict consist of the digital piracy of software and digitally encoded cinematic forms, particularly within China (Wang and Zhu 2003). To this end, IPRs are an unstable architecture for extracting profit.

As Scott McQuire has noted, there is a "strategic rationale" behind the Creative Industries project: "It provides a means for highlighting the significant economic contribution already made collectively by areas which individually may pass unnoticed all too easily" (McQuire 2001:209).[10] In this respect, the Creative Industries concept is a welcome and responsible intervention. But as McQuire also goes on to point out, the creative industries "provides a template for change in educational curricula" (209). This aspect warrants a more circumspect approach to the largely enthusiastic embrace of the concept. Change of course is inevitable and is often much needed. However, there is a conformist principle underpinning the concept of Creative Industries as it has been adopted in Australia—namely the reduction of "creativity" to content production (Cunningham 2002) and the submission of the arts and humanities to the market test, which involves exploiting and generating intellectual property (McQuire 2001:210). What happens to those academic programs that prove unsuccessful in the largely government and market driven push to converge various media of expression into a digital form? How are the actual producers—the "creative" workers—to be protected from the exploitation incurred from being content producers?

It is understandable that the Creative Industries project holds an appeal for managerial intellectuals operating in arts and humanities disciplines in Australia. The Queensland University of Technology (QUT), which claims to have established the world's first Creative Industries faculty, has been particularly active in reproducing the British model[11] which provides a validating discourse for those suffering anxiety disorders over what Ruth Barcan (2003) has called the usefulness of idle intellectual pastimes. As a project that endeavours to articulate graduate skills with labour markets, the Creative Industries is a natural extension of the neoliberal agenda within education as advocated by successive governments in Australia since the Dawkins reforms in the mid 1980s (Marginson and Considine 2000). Certainly there's a constructive dimension to this: graduates, after all, need jobs, and universities should display an awareness of market conditions. I find it remarkable that so many university departments in my own field of communications and media studies are so bold and, let's face it, stupid, as to make unwavering assertions about market demands and student needs on the basis of doing little more than sniffing the wind! Time for a reality check. This means becoming more serious about allocating funds and resources toward market analysis based on the combination of needs between students, staff, disciplinary values, university expectations, and the political economy of markets.

The extent to which there should be a wholesale shift of the arts and humanities into a Creative Industries model is open to debate. The arts and humanities, after all, are a set of disciplinary practices and values that operate as a constitutive outside for Crea-

tive Industries. Indeed, in their Creative Industries manifesto, Stuart Cunningham and John Hartley (2002) loathe the arts and humanities in confused, paradoxical and hypocritical ways in order to establish the arts and humanities as a sort of cultural and ideological outside, yet without acknowledging the constitutive power of that outside. To subsume the arts and humanities into the creative industries is to spell their end, as they are currently conceived, at the institutional level within academe.

Too much specialization in one post-industrial sector ensures a situation of labour reserves that exceed market needs. One only needs to consider all those now unemployed web-designers who graduated from multi-media programs in the mid to late 90s. Vocational specialization does not augur well for the inevitable shift from or collapse of a creative industries economy. Where is the standing reserve of labour shaped by university education and training in a post-creative industries economy? Diehard neoliberals and true-believers in the capacity for perpetual institutional flexibility would say that this isn't a problem. The university will just "organically" adapt to prevailing market conditions and shape its curriculum and staff composition accordingly. Perhaps. Arguably if the university is to maintain a modality of time that is distinct from the just-in-time mode of production characteristic of informational economies—and indeed, such a difference is a quality that defines the market value of the educational commodity—then limits have to be established between institutions of education and the corporate organization or creative industry entity.

The Creative Industries project is a reactionary model insofar as it reinforces the status quo of labour relations within a neoliberal paradigm in which bids for industry contracts are based on a combination of rich technological infrastructures often subsidised by the state (i.e., paid for by the public), high labour skills, a low currency exchange rate, and the lowest possible labour costs. It is no wonder that literature on creative industries omits discussion of the importance of unions within informational, networked economies. What is the place of unions in a labour force constituted as individualized units? (cf. Beck 1992; Bauman 1992; McRobbie 2002; Rossiter 2003b).

There is a great need to explore alternative economic models to the content production one if wealth is to be successfully extracted and distributed from activities in the new media sectors. The suggestion that the Creative Industries project initiates a strategic response to the conditions of cultural production within network societies and informational economies is highly debatable. The now well documented history of digital piracy in the film and software industries and the difficulties associated with regulating violations to proprietors of IP in the form of copyright and trademarks is enough of a reason to look for alternative models of wealth extraction. And you can be sure this will occur irrespective of the endeavours of the creative industries.

The conditions of possibility for Creative Industries within Australia are at the same time its frailties. A significant portion is engaged in film production associated with Hollywood's activities "downunder" and, if it is ever realized, IT developments attached to MIT's planned media lab in Sydney. These are both instances in which IP is not owned by Australian corporations or individuals, but held more often by U.S. based multi-nationals. The success of the creative industries sector depends upon the ongoing combination of cheap labour enabled by a low currency exchange rate and the capacity of students to access the skills and training offered by universities. Of all these factors, much depends on the Australian currency being pegged at a substantially lower

exchange rate than the U.S. dollar. The economic effects in the United States of an expensive military intervention in Iraq and the larger costs associated with the "war on terror," along with the ongoing economic fallout from the dotcom crash and corporate collapses, have all led to a creeping increase in the value of the Australian dollar.

Recent reports in *The Australian Financial Review* support these claims, noting that foreign investment—most particularly from Hollywood film studios—in Australian feature film and television drama production "fell for the first time in eight years" (Williams 2003:20). The 23 per cent drop is directly attributed to the rising Australian dollar. In the case of TV productions, the lack of refundable tax incentives has had a negative effect, unlike New Zealand which adopted incentives for foreign investment in the industry. The drop in expenditure was even greater for international joint ventures: "Expenditure on international co-productions was down 50 per cent in 2002-03, from $102 million in 2001-02 to $51 million, reducing the size of Australian TV and film production by nearly a quarter" (Williams 2003:20). A fall in post-production and foreign production in studios in Sydney, Melbourne, and Queensland is also expected in the coming years. The largely secret negotiations of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Australia and the United States are currently looking to extend copyright protection of U.S. productions from 50 to 70 years and to reduce local content rules that require 55 per cent of all programming in Australia to consist of locally produced programs and ads (AAP 2003:20). Not only will this result in an increase in U.S. imports but, as Australian new media scholar and teacher Chris Chesher has pointed out, "This one bilateral agreement may restrict future governments from making policy that fosters the development of a new media industry in Australia" (2004).

In a globalizing economy that is substantially shaped by the U.S. domestic economy and its transnational corporate interests, the sum effect of these developments is a downgrading of skills and experience in the media industries and fewer jobs for Australian technicians, musicians and actors—a number of whom will be graduates from Creative Industries programs. The security of labour is contingent then upon the relative stability of global financial systems which are underpinned by risk, uncertainty and a faith in the hubris peculiar to discourses on growth and expansion associated with the "New Economy" (Brenner 2002; Gadrey 2003; Lovink 2002c; Tickell 1999). Additional contingencies emerge with government policies that seek to intervene in the supranational, regional and national regulatory fields of trade agreements, privacy rights, and so forth.

In relation to matters such as these there may appear to be no outside for the Creative Industries. However, a model of communications and informationality that locates points of tension, conflict, or antagonism will often discover the constitutive force of an outside at work. As I've argued above, the operation of intellectual property regimes constitutes an outside within creative industries by alienating labour from its mode of information or form of expression. Lash is apposite on this point: "Intellectual property carries with it the right to exclude" (Lash 2002:24). This principle of exclusion applies not only to those outside the informational economy and culture of networks as a result of geographic, economic, infrastructural, and cultural constraints. The very practitioners within the Creative Industries are excluded from control over their creations. It is in this sense that a legal and material outside is established within an informational society. At the same time, this internal outside—to put it rather clumsily—operates in a constitutive manner in as much as the creative industries, by defi-

nition, depend upon the capacity to exploit the IP produced by its primary source of labour. In order to further develop a notion of a constitutive outside, I now turn to Deleuze's logic of immanence and elaborate the elective affinities it holds with Marxian post-negativity. I will then suggest how a constitutive outside is assumed within a comparative media theory of technology and culture.

## Post-Negativity and the Logic of Immanence

The challenge for a politics of informational cultures and socio-technical systems is to define limits at the current conjuncture. In ways similar to New Age devotees, cyber-libertarians, spokespeople for the IMF, and many political activists, proponents of the Creative Industries so often insist on and valorise "openness." In case we have forgotten, openness itself is conditioned by the possibility of exclusion. What are the limits of the informational inside? In the case of Creative Industries, what are the implications of experiencing what Giorgio Agamben calls the event-horizon, or *qualunque* (whatever) as "the event of an outside […] of being-*within* an *outside*" (Agamben 1993, 68)? This sort of question underpins what it means to theorise about those working with the creative industries—a cultural sector that enlists actors with multiple capacities whose innovative labour-power is the condition for their exclusion from absolute self-governance, as bequeathed upon them by a managerial intellectual class within universities, government, R&D agencies, and policy think-tanks such as Demos (U.K.), the Cato Institute (U.S.), and the Centre for Independent Studies (Australia).

In order to build a theoretical framework for thinking the role of the constitutive outside for the Creative Industries, I will briefly outline the notion of post-negativity and then distinguish a Deleuzian logic of immanence from Lash's problematic deployment of a concept of immanence, which he enlists as a metaphor to describe the absolute interiority of relations within information societies. For Lash the notion of a constitutive outside is untenable since it is overdetermined and revealed as transcendent by the action of dialectics. The outside is always already that which is beyond, impossible, false. Lash believes the socio-technical time of dialectics and the technics of industrial production have been surpassed by informationalism (real-time, interactivity, flow). However, is there a way of constructing difference within negativity in a manner that understands the antagonism of the constitutive outside as a processual force of affirmation as distinct from the "negation of negation?"[12] Is there a combinatory practice for media and cultural studies that goes by the name of affirmative critique? Unlike Lash, Chantal Mouffe argues that "the 'constitutive outside' cannot be reduced to a dialectical negation. In order to be a true outside, the outside has to be incommensurable with the inside, and at the same time, the condition of emergence of the latter" (2000:12).[13] For Mouffe, the constitutive outside is not so much a dialectics as a *suspension* (a state of exception), a *movement* whereby that which is excluded or outside is also the condition of possibility for, and conditioned by, the inside, which incorporates the outside as it simultaneously excludes it.[14] I argue that the emergence of Creative Industries is caught up in such a process.

Deleuze understands the operation of this condition in terms of a "fold," which I discuss below. Adorno's concept of "immanent criticism" provides a first point of connection between thinking difference within negativity, the logic of immanence as understood by Deleuze, and the constitutive outside. By my reading of Deleuze, the

constitutive outside is the difference within negativity. In her recent book *Thinking Past Terror*, Susan Buck-Morss summarizes the characteristics of negative dialectics and immanent criticism as follows:

> Relying on the Hegelian dialectics of negativity, combined with a Kantian humility as to the limits of what can be known, immanent criticism as practiced by Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and others sought to transcend the untruth of the present society in a non-dogmatic, critical, hence negative mode, showing the gap between concept and reality—how, for example, so-called democracies were undemocratic; how mass culture was un-cultured; how Western civilization was barbaric; and, in a classic study, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, written in the catastrophic context of World War II, how reason, the highest value of European modernity, had become unreason. (Buck-Morss 2003:94)

Adorno's technique of immanent criticism seeks to uncover the contradictions inherent within the work of Hegel, Kant, Heidegger and orthodox Marxist thinking. Adorno is not interested in judgement from above or the safety net of an external anti-bourgeois position. That would be too easy to feign, and even easier to dismiss. Instead, he seeks to undertake a critique from within, an "immanent critique," that ascertains the failure of philosophical disciplines to think through questions of metaphysics and problems of ontology. Adorno writes: "We have no power over the philosophy of Being if we reject it generally, from outside, instead of taking it on in its own structure—turning its force against it..." (1990:97). Adorno extended this method beyond the realm of philosophy, and into a critique of "mass culture." Susan Buck-Morss explains the operation of immanent critique with reference to Adorno's essay "On the Fetish Character of Music and the Regression of Hearing:"

> Adorno made the characteristics of fetishism, reification, and exchange visible "inside" the phenomenon of listening to music.... Adorno claimed that "serious" and popular music converged not simply because of the revolutions of technological reproduction, but because of the transformations in the relationship between the audience as subject and the music as object, which determined the form of the new technologies as well as being determined by them.... Adorno claimed that the "positive," that is, technological progress in the mass production of music, was in fact "negative," the development of regression in listening: the mass audience, instead of experiencing music, consumed it as a fetishized object, the value of which was determined by exchange. (Buck-Morss 1977:154)

Interestingly, Adorno was not *ipso facto* against taking a position of critique from outside, but only if it served the purpose of immanent critique. In his rejection of the "identity principle" underpinning the Hegelian concept of history, which contrives a coincidence of subject and object, Adorno reserves a space for the outside: "Pure identity is that which the subject posits and thus brings up from the outside. Therefore, paradoxically enough, to criticize it immanently means to criticize it from outside as well" (145). Perhaps in response to the elevated status Benjamin grants to the modern experience of shock, Adorno retains the possibility of an outside, so long as it holds the potential for disruption and the attainment of truth: "No immanent critique can serve its purpose wholly without outside knowledge, of course—without a moment of immediacy, if you will, a bonus from the subjective thought that looks beyond the dialectical structure. That moment is the moment of spontaneity…" (182).

It is this suggestion of an outside that functions as a constitutive force that I wish to retrieve from Adorno's method of immanent critique. Rather than a negativity comprised of contradictions or antinomies whose tensions structurally determine the discontinuity of history and disintegration in Western culture, how might negativity be thought in terms of a diagrammatics of tensions that traverse and constitute overlapping fields of networks—and clusters of Creative Industries—as an affirmative force? Walter Benjamin understood this process in his diagrammatic taxonomies of modern life. His analytical method consisted of identifying tensions located at the intersection between the "axis of transcendence" (theology) and the "the axis of empirical history" (Marxism) (cf. Buck-Morss 1977:249; Osborne 1995:133-159). Thus while he also worked with a model of negative dialectics (a theological, historical materialism of the "dialectical image"[15]), Benjamin was more open than Adorno to the possibility of different arrangements of collision, of splintering, of resonance. His technics of "profane illumination" carried the possibility of mobile, though not arbitrary, combinations and ethico-aesthetic renewal or redemption (Buck-Morss 1989:218,246). In this respect, one can detect an affirmative, as distinct from wholly negative, reworking of historical materialism.

Post-negativity is a mode of critique that thinks beyond the dualisms of subject/object, culture/nature, friend/enemy, us/them, life/death and so forth. Post-negativity defines not just a mode of thought, but thought that emerges from and permeates sociotechnical and historical conditions of the present. Post-negativity retains the concept of a constitutive outside. This is an outside that is configured not according to dualisms, but rather to patterns of distribution, series of encounters, rhythms of tension, spaces of dispute. Negativity persists within informational societies since the informational society is a continuum of the capitalist trajectory in which Negativity, in its modern incarnation, emerged as a concept to address problems as they were perceived (cf. Buck-Morss 1977). The correspondence between negativity and emergent problems figures as an elective affinity within the work of Marx and Deleuze and Guattari. As Deleuze and Guattari write, "All concepts are connected to problems without which they would have no meaning and which can themselves only be isolated or understood as their solution emerges" (1994:16). In a similar vein, Marx writes:

> mankind always takes up only such problems as it can solve, since, looking at the matter more closely, we will always find that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions necessary for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation. (1959:44)

Today, the technique of negativity as a mode of critique is articulated with, but not reducible to, emergent problematics such as access to ICTs, ecological transmogrification, the uneven development of informational economies, and so on. To be sure, these are problems associated with the myriad ways in which new ICTs play an ever increasing role in the mediation of socio-technical relations. To this end, negativity has not so much disappeared or been made redundant; rather, it operates within a different socio-technical historical constellation. The condition of post-negativity is one in which socio-technical and ethico-aesthetic tensions are no longer articulated through the logic or episteme of dialectical negation, but instead through a plurality of differences that are immanent to the scalar dimensions and temporal modalities of states, networks, and socio-political formations.

The problem of conceiving informational technologies and network societies in terms of a supposed erasure of the outside can be usefully addressed through the logic of immanence. A notion of the outside plays an important role in Deleuze's understanding of immanence. This is a point frequently overlooked in recent work by Lash, Buck-Morss, Wark, and Hardt and Negri, among others. Contrary to these thinkers, I would maintain that a notion of the outside plays a central role in any political theory of network societies and informationalism. Combining a notion of the outside with that of immanence introduces a basis upon which to begin understanding the complexity of politics within informationalism, network societies and the Internet. Such a theoretical correspondence invokes the uneven, differentiated and pluralistic nature of socio-technical systems. One is then able to combat the still very much pervasive sense of a "global village" that is so often attributed to the Net, most particularly within popular, business and scientific discourses.

Essentially, Lash deploys the metaphor of immanence as a concept to loosely reinforce his claim that informationalism has no outside. At a conceptual level, we will see that this is plainly wrong. This is also the case at a material level. The brutal phenomenon of "illegal immigrants" again seems a good case in point: at a certain moment in time (the media-political event of an election and beyond[16]) "they" condition the possibility of what it means to be an Australian citizen, what it means to maintain national sovereignty and so forth, while at the same time precarious refugees are excluded from the rights and ways of life that are associated with existing within the rule of the sovereign power as a citizen-subject, or, for the "legitimate" immigrant, as a global cosmopolitan subject. In this sense, "we" do not so much cling to the outside in order to reject it, but are intimately bound with the outside as it is constituted—for the most part—within the spectral dimensions (the media imaginary) of our everyday life.

The phenomenon of flexible production by transnational corporations and the exploitation of sweatshop labour in both developing and developed countries are surely material and symbolic instances of an incommensurable, constitutive outside that conditions the possibility of high living standards, practices of consumption, and material wealth within advanced economies that adopt a neoliberal mode of governance. While labour within the "invisible" zones of production is not directly part of informational economies in terms of belonging to those sectors identified as part of the creative industries, it is nevertheless a condition of possibility for the social relations, consumer dispositions and labour practices within advanced economies. Even those workers located within informationalism are positioned in relation to IPRs in such a manner as to be "outside" processes of power, authority, and decision making, and hence occupy an illegitimate and structurally disabled position *vis-à-vis* a sovereignty of the self and social collectives. Paradoxical as it may seem, outsides of this sort play a constitutive role in terms of what it means to be within the immanent relations of informationalism.

Deleuze maintains that life can be practiced as an experiment, experience and thought process in radical empiricism. In dialogue with Guattari, Parnet, Foucault and "an image of thought" that subsists within the present as "coordinates, dynamics, orientations" for philosophy (Deleuze 1995:148-149, 1994:37), Deleuze invents a "prephilosophical" plan—a chaosmosis of virtuality, a plane of immanence, a force of potentiality—in which "relations are external to their terms" and from which transcendent organization is possible (1991; 2002:133).[17] The instituted plane of immanence constructs a network of relations of force that condition the possibility of con-

cepts (1994:40-41; 1995:146). Yet concepts are not "deduced from the plane" (1994:40). Concepts subsist within or "populate" the plane of immanence as "virtualities, events, singularities" (2001:31). As Deleuze and Guattari write, "Concepts pave, occupy, or populate the plane bit by bit, whereas the plane itself is the indivisible milieu in which concepts are distributed without breaking up its continuity or integrity..." (1994:36). Concepts are created in response to specific problems; the relationship between the two is one of immanence. The force of a constitutive outside, a univocity, makes possible the singular relationship between problems and concepts.

Deleuze and Guattari provide two conceptions of the plan(e),[18] one in opposition to the other: a plan(e) of organisation and development as distinct from a plane of consistency or composition or immanence. The former comprises a structural and genetic order, the latter consists of rhythms and resonances in which "there are only relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness between unformed elements…. There are only haecceities, affects, subjectless individuations that constitute collective assemblages" (1987:266). The plane of organization, on the other hand, is engaged in capturing and momentarily containing the pure potential of the plane of immanence. The plane of organization consists of "rigid segmentarity, all the lines of rigid segmentarity, [that] enclose a certain plane, which concerns both forms and their development, subjects and their formation. A plane of organization which always has at its disposal a supplementary dimension (overcoding)" (2002:130). Moreover,

> Organization and development concern form and substance: at once the development of form and the formation of substance or a subject. But the plane of consistency knows nothing of substance and form: haecceities [singularities], which are inscribed on this plane, are precisely modes of individuation proceeding neither by form nor by the subject. (1987:507)

The plane of immanence and the plane of transcendent organization are coextensive with the relational force of movement between the conditions of possibility and the grid of meanings, codes and signs (Massumi 2002:2-12; Rossiter 2003a). A processual force subsists in the movement between these two planes. This model may seem to be nothing more than a crude attempt to cunningly reappropriate the classical Marxist notions of base and superstructure. The differences with that model, however, are considerable. First, the base/superstructure consists of a dialectical relationship in which the social relations which define the economic base and mode of production determine the superstructure. As Massumi writes: "When everything is served up in founding terms of determination—'of' or 'by'—by design or by default—change can only be understood as a negation of determination: as the simply indeterminate" (2002:69). The logic of immanence is not one of determination or the indeterminate: it is not One or the Other. Neither total order, nor absolute chaos. Immanence communicates the force of movement that subsists within relations between determination and indeterminacy. Second, the plane of immanence, unlike the Marxian notion of the base, does not privilege the category of "class" as the transcendent principle or motivation for political change; indeed, the category of class subsists in the plane of organization—or at which has emerged from and is in a mobile relationship with the plane of immanence. Moreover, the relation between the two planes is a multiplicity of "interleaved" planes. Think of a cross-section diagram of a geological formation—there is no single layer, but rather a complex distribution and interpenetration of layers that in

themselves are composed of a complex interleaving of materials, properties, qualities. "Every plane of immanence is a One-All," write Deleuze and Guattari, "it is not partial like a scientific system, or fragmentary like concepts, but distributive—it is in 'each.' *The* plane of immanence is *interleaved*" (1994:50). In other words, the plane of immanence does not function as a foundation or determining instance; it functions as a pure potential of virtuality. Agamben describes this process as one of "virtual indetermination" (1993:233). Massumi elaborates the operation of the virtuality of the field of immanence in terms of super-empiricism: "Although inseparable from the empirical elements of whose contingent mixing it is an effect, the field of immanence is superempirical—in excess over the substantiality of already-constituted terms" (Massumi 2002:76).

Deleuze most clearly establishes the operation of the outside within the plane of immanence in his book on Foucault. Deleuze reads Foucault as a cartographer of relations comprised of forces, strategies, foldings, forms of expression, and forms of content that constitute the social field. Deleuze's *Foucault* offers a diagram of sociality, an abstract machine with which to think the act of mapping projects as a multiplicity of relations. Such an approach holds a radical difference to the numerous mapping projects undertaken within the Creative Industries that seek to delimit the field of creativity and at the same time ignore the policy, theoretical, political and practical implications of intellectual property regimes. This is paradoxical to say the least, as it is supposedly the generation and exploitation of IP that distinguishes the Creative Industries from others. Danny Butt elaborates on this problematic within Creative Industries' mapping projects as follows:

> They basically work on aggregating output in unreconstructed industry sector definitions ("Publishing" + "TV" + "..." = "Creative Industries") that they acknowledge are inadequate in their own footnotes! My view is that most "mapping" is a political exercise to secure resources from governments, and impressive-sounding figures go down better than "We still don't know how IP generates macroeconomic wealth, but we know your existing classifications will need to be changed." There's a huge, relatively untheorised disjuncture between the attempt to theoretically delimit the "Creative Industries" through their special relationship to IP (which has merit), the practical problems of capitalist accumulation within these industries (which are characterised by IP struggles), and the regional mapping projects which basically ignore this process of IP-intensive accumulation. (Butt 2004)

Registering the complex of relations between different actants, forces, discourses, and practices that constitute the transformative potential of creative labour is a process, I am suggesting, that can benefit from a Deleuzo-Foucauldian cartography of immanence. Deleuze distinguishes between a notion of "the exterior" and that of "the outside." The latter "exists as an unformed element of forces" (1988a:43). Force is a relation: "it is never singular but essentially exists with other forces" (70). Force subsists, then, within the plane of immanence. Force is a potential; it is a multiplicity of relations that possess the power to affect, to shape, to create. Force thus functions as a constitutive outside. The exterior, by contrast, is "the area of concrete assemblages, where relations between forces are realized" (43). The actualization of forces takes on what Deleuze terms "forms of exteriority"—these may share the same concrete assemblage, but will differ from one another (43).

Drawing on Foucault's *Archaeology of Knowledge*, Deleuze gives the example of the keyboard and its letters and their relationship to a statement. The keyboard and the letters are a "visibility," yet they are not a statement: "they are external to the statement but do not constitute its outside" (1988a:79). The keyboard is a "concrete assemblage" which realises "relations between forces." The keyboard, in a sense, awaits the force of the outside. The keyboard, as we know, is a component within various communications media—typically the typewriter or computer. Statements that may emerge from the typewriter are conditioned by an articulation with other forms of exteriority, both human and non-human: a desk, a chair, a human, a burning cigarette, an empty cup of coffee, etc. The articulation between these singular entities holds no essential relationship. Rather, the concrete assemblage—the articulation of parts—is an actualization of "relations that are external to their terms."

The articulation between the human and the machine—what Jünger termed an "organic construction," Benjamin a "mimetic correspondence," and McLuhan "the extensions of man"—also holds the potential to create, to compose. The force of the outside creates what Deleuze calls a diagram of topological relations in which "the inside is constituted by the folding of the outside" (1988a:119). The fold consists of a "doubling" of relations of force between inside and outside (1995:98; 1988:119). The fold constitutes a zone of life (subjectivation), "inventing new 'possibilities of life'" and new capacities of expression (1995:98; cf. Angus 1998:26-27). Media and cultural theorists who speak of "global capital, global production, global labor migrations, and global penetration by technologies of communications" in terms of a "global immanence" that has "no outside" (Buck-Morss 2003:93) are taking, at best, a lazy shortcut to a mode of critique that dispenses of the ethico-political diagram of power and reflexivity that makes possible the very objects of study they wish to critique.

## Comparative Media Theory and the Constitutive Outside

Just as language has an outside—the limit *of* language, as noted in the epigraph by Deleuze—so too does the Creative Industries have an outside. To paraphrase Deleuze: Creative Industries' outside is not *outside* the creative industries, it is the outside *of* Creative Industries. The outside of the Creative Industries is the limit of critique from within. The limit of Creative Industries is defined by critique from the outside, which is at once a part of the constitutive dimension of the Creative Industries. The kind of critique I am proposing is one that addresses the multiplicity of outsides of the Creative Industries: these include the situation of creative labour in new media industries. This is living labour whose function, at least within the discourse of the Creative Industries, is to generate IP in order that it can be exploited. It is labour's internal outsides that operate on lines of class, ethnicity, age, and gender (Gill 2002). Each of the components that constitute the plane of Creative Industries—academics, students, government, local business, service staff, new media workers, along with various media of communication and techniques of expression—has its own plane or logic of operation. Each of these components populates the plane of Creative Industries, and the relations between them are external to their terms. That is, each component or element functions within its own universe of sensibility, its own horizon of reference, its own system of communication.

It is useful to think of the operation of these components in terms of paradigms that are located on a larger plane of organization. While each paradigm has its own distinctive features, they hold the potential to interleave with each other. Within Marxian negativity, the potential for correspondence is predicated on an underlying socio-aesthetic antagonism. Within the Deleuzian logic of immanence, the interrelationship between component parts can be understood as the affirmation of difference. Within comparative media theory, the communication or articulation between different actors is constituted through an "internally generative" process that is situated within an external context (Angus 1992:536). In each case, the point of intersection is a combination of antagonism, affirmation and constitution. What brings these three processes together is a notion of the outside. Such an assemblage signals the limits of critique from within.

In order to illustrate these points, I detour through the work of Canadian political economist and communications theorist, Harold A. Innis.[19] In "Orality in the Twilight of Humanism," Ian Angus describes Innis's method as one of "micrology:" "He focuses on characteristic events within a society. He doesn't begin by characterizing the whole but from specific events, giving us a plurality of glimpses of these specific events, creating a montage effect that implies the nature of the whole" (1993:31). Explaining the relation between institutions, knowledge monopolies, and communications media in Innis's interpretation of society, Angus writes: "Institutions are based on a medium of communication that is the most significant within that institution, which 'monopolises' knowledge through monopolising access to, and use of, that medium of communication" (28-29). Clearly, the Creative Industries are not a communications medium *per se*; they are, nevertheless, a cluster of institutional forms and discursive practices articulated with various media of communication (film and TV, digital technologies, architecture, photography, the arts and crafts, etc.). Thus the Creative Industries do not utilise any single medium, but a combination of media forms, each with its own rules and capacities of expression. What bridges these communications media and their attendant practices is a combination of the juridical and economic architecture of intellectual property (primarily copyright) and the labour-power which it subsumes. As long as media corporations, government departments and university programs see the exploitation of intellectual property as the means of wealth creation, the institutional effect is a monopoly of knowledge and a disregard of the desires of creative labour for self-sustaining work practices—technics of labour that are not subject to the vagaries of the politically motivated inequality of free trade agreements or fluctuating currency rates that determine the transnational movement of film and TV drama production, for example.

What Innis calls the "bias" of communication can be understood in terms of a constitutive outside. In *The Bias of Communication* (1951), the duration and expansion of empires is understood in terms of communications media and transport technologies peculiar to any culture, location, and epoch, and the attendant "bias" towards either time or space that such media and technologies invariably have. In his survey of the rise and fall of the city-states of ancient civilizations and the economies of modern nation-states, Innis considers a bias toward space or time as a defining feature of "the monopoly of knowledge," and hence control, by the hegemon.

Innis also charts the ways in which colonial empires and nation-states in the industrial era were defined by the dependency of the metropole on the capacity of the colonies to

supply staple products that can then be processed into commodity objects and energy resources in the metropole, distributed back out to the colonies, and traded across empires. As Ian Angus and Brian Shoesmith put it, "These conditions of production meant, in fact, that the margins continually subsidised the centre" (1993a:7). Dependency theory is based on the logic, then, of a core/periphery model of geopolitics and political economy.

Unlike dependency models developed in world-systems theory and area studies, within Innis's framework a dependency relationship is not automatically a unilinear one where the ruling colonial power exerts unmitigated control over its colonial territories. Innis paid attention to the multi-layered dynamic and the interrelationships between centres and margins, and his concepts of space, time, and technological bias provided the basis upon which to locate the pivotal role played by communications media in the constitution of social relations. As Angus has noted, it is a mistake to see such a "method of investigation" as one of technological determination:

> It is not the claim that the media of communication determine the form of the
> society, but rather the suggestion that investigation of the constitutive elements of
> a society as media of communication, shows that the micrological organisation
> prefigures and articulates the macrological structure. (1993:31)

At first glance, the spatial or temporal bias of different media, the relationship between "centres" and "margins," and the efficiency or inefficiency of communication in conditioning the success of empires are characteristics that can be explicated through the logic of negative dialectics. As Judith Stamps has argued, Innis's method of analysis proceeds by a series of juxtapositions "in a manner comparable to the constellations created by Adorno, Benjamin, and McLuhan" (Stamps 1995:85). Innis's approach departed, however, from his Frankfurt School counterparts in ways that signalled his attention to the problems of his own geopolitical and cultural situation. "Unlike them," writes Jody Berland, "Innis found himself poised between two conflicting dispositions: the bleak, post-totalitarian, anti-scientist and post-enlightenment vision exemplified by Adorno's 'negative dialectics' versus the more pragmatic nation-building culturalist modernity of his own milieu" (Berland1997a:31).

In foregrounding the "positive" and "negative" attributes of different communications media and their capacity to engender time or space-binding societies, Innis read the sensory imbalance of Western civilization against those premodern civilizations that had flourished due to a balance between oral and aural media and visual media of print and the written word. A balance or efficiency in communication determined the efficacy and longevity of an empire. In the event of one medium of communication dominating over others, a stasis will prevail that prevents an openness to creativity and thought. Print media, for example, have a spatial bias that emphasizes a preoccupation with administration, law and immediacy, neglecting aspects of continuity, tradition, and systems of belief—features of media that are durable over time (Innis 1951:33-34). Innis's interest, then, was to study the material characteristics of different media of communication in order to "appraise its influence in its cultural setting" (33). His concern was for a "co-existence of different media of communication," so that the bias of one may be "checked" against the bias of another, creating "conditions favourable to an interest in cultural activity" (90).

Irrespective of whether the resulting bias of a medium of communication is a temporal or spatial one, certain monopolies of knowledge constituted in institutional form will follow in its wake. Within Innis's notions of bias and dependency, one can detect the operation of a constitutive outside. The bias toward time of the Babylonian city-state is only made apparent when it is "checked" against the bias toward space of the Hittites. The communicative bias articulated by each of these cultures is a virtual one of pure potential, subsisting within a plane of immanence until it is actualized through a plane of organization. The relations between these two planes are variously antagonistic, affirmative and constitutive. The external form of one communicative arrangement interleaves with another, and in so doing their respective bias toward time or space is expressed in material ways via the constitutive force of the outside. Angus explains how a comparative media theory is derived from the interrelationships between immanence, outside, inside, and the expressive capacities of communications media:

> [W]hile there is an immanent history of media forms, there is also a transcendental history of the constitution of media forms themselves…. Through this doubling, immanent history is turned "outside" toward a wonder at the phenomenon of expression itself. (1998:26)

Through the force of the outside, we can see how the transformation of the city-state of Babylon is conditioned by a plurality of "relations [that] are external and irreducible to their terms," as Deleuze deduces in his study of Hume's empiricism. Radical empiricism, as a diagrammatic philosophy of relations, tells us something about the potential habitus of a communications medium: it too "defines itself through the position of a precise problem, and through the presentation of the conditions of this problem" (Deleuze 1991:107; cf. Rossiter 2003a). Certainly, as far as its material properties go, clay was heavier and less transportable than the substance of papyrus used by the ancient Egyptians. The reproduction of clay tablets is also less efficient than a substance like paper, especially once paper became articulated with the printing press and the political-economic need to administer mobile populations within the external form of the nation-state at the onset of modernity in the West. But there is nothing inherent about the material properties and expressive capacities of alluvial clay deposits that determines its transformation into the communications medium of the clay writing tablet. Such a development is contingent upon the alignment of political, economic and cultural forces that coalesce to address the problem at hand.

## Conclusion

In this essay I have sought to derive an understanding of the constitutive force of the outside as it figures in relation to the Creative Industries, cultural criticism, and comparative media theory. I have argued that the force of the constitutive outside is what links these three approaches as socio-technical idioms. Moreover, the constitutive outside manifests in material ways and holds expressive capacities. In the case of the Creative Industries, the constitutive outside is a force of relations characterised by two key features: antagonism in the form of the exploitation of creative labour as it subsists within a juridico-political architecture of intellectual property regimes; and the affirmation of creative labour that holds the potential for self-organization in the form of networks (cf. Rossiter 2003b).

As far as negative critique goes, the lineage between Adorno and Deleuze stems from the notion of immanent critique. In a moment of seeming optimism, Adorno considers the limit of immanent critique as that which is embodied in the instant of the "leap," though according to Adorno, this is only made possible by the undertaking of negative dialectics (Adorno 1990:182). Following Deleuze, my interest has been in how immanent critique can be read as an affirmative force that retains the act of critique. The limit of critique from within is not a closure or negation, but rather an opening of possibilities. As Deleuze writes, "the outside is always an opening on to a future…" (Deleuze 1988a:89). It is in this sense that the affirmation of living labour, for instance, conditions the possibility of Creative Industries. But this transformative force of the outside is one that institutes a substantially different form of Creative Industries to the kind that passes as dominant culture today.

Communications media play a vital role in securing the creative potential of labour-power as a transformative force. As Angus reminds us, "Communication media thus constitute, through human labour, the limits of what is experienceable and the *manner* in which it is experienced in a social formation" (1993:19). The spatial bias of the Creative Industries as they currently stand is clearly apparent in their cartography of power that seeks to exploit the IP generated by creative labour. Such empire building is done at the expense of nurturing creative development over time.

### Notes

1. Or perhaps, more correctly after Baudrillard, a *globalisation* of media culture and information flows, since universality for Baudrillard (2003) is homologous with ethical principles such as human rights, whereas globalization is a term that has emerged with the advent of new ICTs, post-1989 world events, and the re-scaling of capital. One does not speak of "global" human rights, for example. Rather human rights are a set of principles that may be idealized, and rarely adhered to.

2. The best critique I've read so far of Lash's book is Hassan (2003).

3. Or as Kafka elegantly deduced: "Capitalism is a system of relationships, which go from inside to out, from outside to in, from above to below, and from below to above. Everything is relative, everything is in chains. Capitalism is a condition both of the world and of the soul" (quoted in Thoburn 2003:69).

4. Here I am appropriating a phrase by Susan Buck-Morss (2003), who is referring to the constitutive outside as it operates within secular Islamic discourse in Turkey.

5. At least one of the key proponents of the Creative Industries in Australia is ready to acknowledge this. See Cunningham (2003).

6. I have addressed the problematic of "immateriality" with reference to creative labour in Rossiter (2003b).

7. Flew (2002:154-159) is one of the rare exceptions, though even here there is no attempt to identify the implications IPRs hold for those working in the creative industries sectors.

8. As one would expect from the "internationalization" of cultural studies, counter-readings of the emergence of cultural studies within Britain, and the significance it holds for local contexts, are inevitable. Interesting work on this topic from an Australian perspective includes Wark (1992a), Flew (1997), Gibson (1998, 1999, 2003), Lewis (2003, 2004) and Gregg (2003, 2004a, 2004b).

9. In this respect, it is possible to draw a parallel between the Creative Industries project within Queensland and its institutional predecessor, the Australian Key Centre for Cultural and Media Policy, directed by Tony Bennett. For a critique of the tendency by advocates of cultural policy studies—particularly Bennett—to read Foucauldian "governmentality" as a variation of Althusserian "ISAs," see Grace (1991). Interestingly enough, McKenzie Wark (1992b) adopts the position of an "outsider intellectual" in his critique of Bennett and cultural policy studies.

10. A recent QUT report commissioned by the Brisbane City Council provides some illuminating statistics on the varying concentrations of workers in the Creative Industries across Australia. There aren't too many surprises. Of the seven capital cities in Australia in 2001, Sydney holds the highest proportion of creative industry workers (90,6000 or 40.1%). Melbourne has 63,453 (28.1%), Brisbane (25,324), Perth (21,211), Adelaide (15,345), Canberra (6,916), and the Greater Hobart Area (3, 055) (Cunningham et al., 2003:16). At a statistical level then, Sydney pretty much leaves Melbourne for dead when it comes to that rather parochial old debate over which city is Australia's "cultural capital." Still, you'd have to disagree when it comes down to which city has better food, bars, galleries and quality of life for the "bourgeois bohemians," or "bobos" (Brooks, 2000)—Melbourne wins hands down when the quantitatively feeble indices are considered.

11. Creative Industries Faculty, QUT, http://www.creativeindustries.qut.com. A number of research papers and reports can be found at the Creative Industries Research and Applications Centre, http://www.creativeindustries.qut.com/research/cirac/index.jsp.

12. Zizek reads the Hegelian "negation of negation" as "nothing but repetition at its purest: in the first move, a certain gesture is accomplished and fails; then, in the second move, this same gesture is simply *repeated*" (1999:74). Such a manoeuvre, I would argue, does not account for the indeterminacy of difference that attends the affirmative role of the constitutive outside.

13. Mouffe acknowledges that she is drawing on the work of Derrida for her understanding of a constitutive outside. I am taking quite a different route by engaging the work of Deleuze, who defines the relationship between inside and outside in terms of the "fold."

14. In this respect, there seems to me to be a correlation between a Marxian-Lacanian (e.g., Zizek) understanding of "the Real" and a Derridean/Levinasian (Blanchot?) idea of the incommensurable.

15. Or what Adorno called Benjamin's radical "negative theology." See Buck-Morss (1989:244).

16. The 2001 federal election in Australia was notable for the conspicuous and cynical campaign of fear run by the incumbent government, John Howard's conservative coalition party. Howard played a central role in exploiting a media generated fear that fed upon the events of September 11 and "illegal" refugees, many of whom were Afghani assylum seekers arriving in Australian territorial waters, fleeing the ravages of war and political persecution. Many have put Howard's success in gaining a third term in office down to his ability to contruct a media-facilitated discourse in which the 'security" of an Australian way of life depended on the capacity of a powerful state to determine which "outsiders" would be allowed to become "one of us." Articulating terrorists with assylum seekers worked as a key strategy in constructing this discourse of fear of the "outside."

17. A helpful elaboration of immanent and transcendent traditions in the history of philosophy—with a specific focus on contemporary French philosophy—can be found in Smith (2003).

18.  It is ugly, for sure, to adopt parentheses within a word to signal the dual meaning of a term. Here I am following Massumi's technique of translation in *A Thousand Plateaus* for signalling the both words, plan and plane. In a translator's note to Deleuze's *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, Robert Hurley makes the following useful clarification: "The French word *plan* … covers virtually all the meanings of the English plan and plane. To preserve the major contrast that Deleuze sets up here, between *plan d'immanence ou de consistance* and *plan de transcendance ou d'organisation*, I have used 'plane' for the first term, where the meaning is, roughly, a conceptual-affective continuum, and 'plan' for the second term. The reader should also keep in mind that 'plan' has the meaning of 'map' in English as well." See Hurley, translator's note in Deleuze (1988b:199).

In light of this distinction, it might seem more appropriate to adopt Hurley's strategy and use the word plane where referring "to the plane of immanence," and the word plan, where referring to "the plan of organization." However, I will make occasional use of the combinatory form of the two words—plan(e)—rather than deploy them separately, since one does not necessarily preclude the operation of the other; rather, there are complex interleavings, overlaps, and foldings between the plane and the plan. And as Deleuze and Guattari note, there is a "hidden principle" and "hidden structure" within the plan(e) that "exists only in a supplementary dimension to that to which it gives rise (*n* + 1) … It is a plan(e) of transcendence. It is a plan(e) of analogy … It is always inferred. *Even if it is said to be immanent*, it is so only by the absence, analogically (metaphorically, metonymically, etc.)." See Deleuze and Guattari (1987:265-266, emphasis in original.)

It is in this sense in which the plane of immanence subsists, albeit as a supplementary dimension, within that which has emerged as the plan or grid of organization that it remains useful to retain the double sense of the French word *plan*. I will detail this complex relation by way of example below, when I return to the operation of an outside within the discourse of creative industry, as espoused by the CITF and others that adopt their terms of reference.

19. I am aware that readers of *Topia* are, for the most part, more than familiar with Innis and Canadian communications theory. Even so, I hope my reading of Innis is different enough to hold your interest as I reproduce the familiar themes in Innis's work. (cf. Special issue of *Continuum* on Innis and dependency theory edited by Angus and Shoesmith (1993b); Stamps (1995), Acland and Buxton (1999), Drache (1995), Carey (1989) and Berland (1997b). For an interesting example of the migration of Innis into the field of international relations, see Deibert (1999).

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